

Knowledge Organisers

Yr12

What is knowledge Key terms

Three different types of knowledge

Propositional knowledge (knowing that)

Can always be expressed in language. It is a sentence that makes a claim about the world such as 'I am hungry' or 'There are 4 fish in the bowl'.

What is asserted by such sentences are called propositions.

So factual knowledge is called propositional knowledge. SO THIS WHOLE TOPIC IS CONCERNED WITH THIS TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE.

Acquaintance knowledge, (knowing of)

Obtained by a direct experience, interaction, between a person and the object the person is perceiving. For example, Dean knows the President of America.

Ability knowledge, or practical knowledge, (knowing how).

Required to do a particular kind of skill, day-to-day, hands-on experience. For example, Dean knows how to ride a bike. It is contextual, and helps you acquire the specific techniques that enable you to gain a particular skill or ability.

Linda Zagzebski: the nature of definition

Different types of definitions of knowledge.

- Some objects have a real essence, a cause that makes a thing the way it is, for example, water is the way it is because of its chemical composition H₂O, therefore, if an object has a real essence, then it can have a real definition.
- In contrast, some objects do not have a cause that makes them that thing, for example, weeds. There is no genetic difference between a weed and non-weeds. It's a question of which plants a human wants in their garden, we can define the term 'weeds' but it is not a real definition as they do not have a real essence.
- Zagzebski is sceptical about whether knowledge can have a real essence, as the term knowledge varies so much, it could be a social construct, but we should treat knowledge as if it does have a real essence.
- Zagzebski says we should avoid these 4 pitfalls when defining knowledge:
 1. Circularity: Definitions should not include the term being defined, e.g. justice is just.
 2. Obscure: Terms in any definition should not be more obscure than the original term.
 3. Negative: Defining a term by what it is does not help, e.g. defining a good act as 'one that is not wrong'.
 4. Ad hoc: Coming up with a definition that is specific to meeting a particular problem, e.g. defining knowledge as JTB that is not a Gettier counter-example.

Necessary and sufficient conditions

Necessary conditions: Something you need in order to have the thing in question. A is a necessary condition for B, when you have to have A in order to have B. Water is a necessary condition of rain. You cannot have rain without water, yet, water is not enough to guarantee rain, as a lake is not rain, therefore, water is a necessary but not sufficient definition of rain.

Sufficient condition: A is a sufficient condition for B when you if you have A you must have B too. In other words, having A is enough or sufficient to guarantee that you have B. Means you will always have the thing in question. Being an aunt is a sufficient condition to have relatives.

Some conditions can be both sufficient and necessary when put together, for example, a bachelor is an unmarried man, these conditions are both necessary and sufficient to guarantee a bachelor as without these two conditions you cannot be a bachelor.

Plato's definition of knowledge

The tripartite definition of knowledge

Propositional knowledge is defined as justified true belief: S knows that p if and only if:
S is justified in believing that p,
p is true and
S believes that p (individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions)
When these conditions are met they are jointly sufficient to define knowledge.

Plato: The tripartite theory of knowledge: K=JTB and issues with the definition



Plato states that if my beliefs are true, then they are just as useful to me as 'knowledge'.

But we value knowledge more, as it is backed up by reason or evidence, therefore, it is more dependable than a belief.

The evidence gives us good reason to continue to believe what we do. Where as, if there is no evidence then we have nothing which convinces us of our belief, therefore, knowledge is to have a true belief secured by reason.

The evidence though must be rational, as otherwise we cannot say it is knowledge, for example a jury may find a man guilty for poor reasons, but we would not want to say the jury had knew the man was guilty.

So he comes to the conclusion that knowledge is justified, true, belief.



Issues with JTB: Are the conditions individually necessary?

Can you have knowledge without the belief condition?

It is plausible to know a proposition without believing in it. No one would say it is raining without believing it. But beyond asserting, belief may not be needed for knowledge.

Some say knowledge is about successful action, for example, you might, hesitatingly get a quiz answer right as you have been taught it, but you cannot remember it. So in this case, you knew it, even though you did not truly believe you did.

Knowledge and belief are different mental states. As knowledge is infallible, but beliefs can be fallible, so knowledge must involve going beyond belief.

Can you have knowledge without the truth condition?

We can know things that can later be found to be false, e.g. the earth being flat.

But, people did 'know' things in the past, things that we no longer count as knowledge now. The concept of truth was bound by their time, not the time now. Some say the earth being flat was never knowledge in the first place and so people never 'knew' it.

But, both views still require knowledge to be true.

Can you have knowledge without justification?

Most would say you do need justification for knowledge, however, if your knowledge comes from a reliable source then justification is not necessary., therefore justification may not always be necessary for knowledge.

Gettier: Issues with the tripartite theory

1. JTB are necessary **but not sufficient conditions for knowledge**
2. **Some beliefs are inferred from false beliefs.**
3. **JTB is open to infinite regress**

Gettier cases

Smith and Jones:: Case of lucky, true, belief.

Smith and Jones are both going for a job. Smith has evidence that Jones will get the job (the boss of the company told him). Smith also has evidence that Jones has 10 coins in his pocket (he counted them). Smith forms the belief that the man with 10 coins in his pocket will get the job. Smith (not Jones) gets the job. By coincidence, Smith had 10 coins in his pocket, so Smith's belief that the man with 10 coins in his pocket would get the job was a) belief, b) true, c) justified (to some extent) So smith has JTB..

But, luck was involved, so Smith did not have knowledge, he was unlucky that his belief about Jones getting the job was wrong, and he was lucky that he also had 10 coins in his pocket.

But we do not want to say Smith had knowledge as it was based on luck.

Brown in Barcelona:

Smith thinks Jones owns a ford, and he has evidence to believe this. Smith has another friend Brown, he does not know where Brown is at the moment but on the strength of his first belief he forms a new belief that Brown is in Barcelona. By coincidence Brown is in Barcelona so his belief was justified, and true. But did he know it? No, lucky true belief.

Zagzebski: JTB will always leave a gap between justification and truth.

A doctor believes a patient has virus X. the tests show this, so the evidence backs up the doctors diagnosis.

However, the symptoms are actually caused by a new, unknown virus Y (The doctor was unlucky with their prior justification)

But, it turns out, the patient does have virus x too, but at a stage where it is too early to show up in tests (so her belief was luckily true).

This is like the Gettier examples, and so people would say the doctor did not have knowledge that the patient had virus X.

Zagzebski: Only by linking the justification to the truth of the belief can we avoid Gettier-style cases like above and to the left. Only when true beliefs are held because of the justification should we claim knowledge.
(VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY HAS THIS APPROACH)



Fake barns

Barney is driving through fake-barn county, lots of fake barns have been built consisting of just a barn front. Barney looks to the side and sees a big red barn. On the basis of this he believes there is a big red barn by the road. However, it just so happens that this is the only real barn in the whole area! Does Barney know there was a big red barn there?

Barney saw a real barn with his eyes, believed there was a real barn, and there was a real barn. The luck involved is that it happened to be the only real barn for miles and he had no idea the other barns were fake this relies on the wider context making the belief seem luckily true.

So we can define the two types as:

1. Gettier counter-examples involving luck, the justification being unluckily not applying but the belief luckily being true anyway.
2. Fake barn cases. The justification is not false in any way, but the believer does not know that they are in an unusual context which makes their belief seem luckily true

If these examples of JTB do not count as knowledge, then it seems that JTB cannot be the sufficient conditions for knowledge.

Responses to Gettier: NOT PLATO'S RESPONSES

Infallibilism

You know that p if :

p is true

You believe p

You cannot rationally doubt p

Infallibilism: Gettier style counter-examples rely on luck, to remove this to claim that knowledge can only be allowed if the justification is that strong that it is impossible to be wrong (infallible).

We should only count as knowledge these things we cannot rationally doubt, e.g. that you exist, $2+2=4$, that you're seeing the colour white with black writing.

Beliefs can be doubted, knowledge cannot. For example, pain. When you are in pain, you know you are, it makes no sense to say you believe your in pain, as you know you are. Other people maybe able to see that your in pain, so they would hold a belief about your pain, but they would not know your in pain, but there is no possibility of you being wrong about being on pain. Not open to Gettier style counter-examples, as our knowledge requires a level of certainty which works with our intuition.

No false lemmas (K=JTBN)

You know that p if :

p is true

You believe p

Your belief that p is justified

You did not infer p from anything false

No false lemmas: A lemma is a premise accepted as true in an argument.

The Gettier examples include a false belief/lemma, so they should not be considered examples of knowledge.

Smith's belief that the man with 10 coins in his pocket was based on a false belief that Jones would get the job, so the false lemma is that he believes Jones will get the job because he has been told so. The same with Jones owning a Ford.

So no false lemmas claims that knowledge is justified, true belief where the justification is not based on false belief.

Reliabilism (K=RTB)

You know that p if :

p is true

You believe p

Your knowledge of p comes from a reliable source

Reliabilism: Linking knowledge to the reliability of the person or thing that led to it.

Consider a quality newspaper compared to gossip, one is more reliable and trustworthy than the other as it produces the truth more than the other source.

So with beliefs, we should only grant the status of knowledge to those beliefs that have been formed by a reliable source as it is highly likely to result in true belief.

Replaces justification with reliabilism. Animals have evolved to have reliable processes of vision, cognition, memory etc. these reliable processes mean they can interact successfully with the world and so we can say they have knowledge about it.

Virtue epistemology (K=VTB)

You know that p if :

p is true

You believe p

Your true belief is as a result of you exercising your intellectual virtues

Virtue epistemology: An act of knowledge occurs when the belief is successful (it is true) and where its success stems from intellectual virtues (so not just luckily true).

SOSA: 3 key elements in shooting an arrow.

1. Accuracy, hits the target, likewise a belief is accurate if it is true.
2. Skilful, a belief is skilful if formed by an intellectual virtue.
3. Aptness, accurate because it was skilful, an apt belief is one that is true because it was formed with intellectual virtue.

The Gettier cases were not a result of any intellectual virtues, it was just coincidence. Under Sosa's version of VE, Smith's beliefs would not count as knowledge even though it was an accurate skilful belief it was not apt. But the fake barn example would fit with Sosa's view and so would be knowledge, yet many people would say it is not. But Sosa would say it is an animal knowledge, not human. Human knowledge requires the ability to reflect on your belief which an animal cannot as Barney cannot tell if his belief is apt or not.

Criticisms of the responses to Gettier counter-examples

Do the responses cope with Gettier?

Infallibilism

Goes against our intuition that we can know lots of things, infallibilism would imply we know very little knowledge, most of our claims would be classed as beliefs. Knowledge is limited as we can not get knowledge from TV shows or documentaries. As if we are not certain of something then we have no knowledge.

No false lemmas

Copes well with Gettier counter-examples, but Zagzebski's examples, its not so clear that she has a false belief. With the fake barn case, Barney sees a barn and thinks its real, there is no false belief, the only thing we could say is that they are based on assumption.

Some cases are clear that a false belief is involved but not all. Example, you believe it is the middle of the day, you see clock that says it is 12 o'clock and so you know believe it is 12 o'clock. No premise was false but is this knowledge? Probably not as it could be based on assumption or luck.

Reliabilism

Some processes are not reliable, and the beliefs they generate should not be classed as knowledge. Copes well with Gettier cases including fake barns. But it would imply that any process that is reliable would count as knowledge without any 'internal' justification, so animals or even fortune tellers could have knowledge depending on their intuition. If reliabilism is equivalent to justification that does this solve the problem of circularity as they are just changing a condition for the same thing. Could argue that we are a brain in a vat (jar) as if the experience is exactly the same in reality and as a brain in a vat then the belief is justified. In replacing justification with reliabilism it does not give an adequate account of the relationship between our beliefs and our justifications.

Virtue epistemology

This explores what conditions can a person be able to assert that they have knowledge which is a different question to what is knowledge, so it does not cope well with Gettier.

Possible Exam Questions

What is a necessary condition? (3 marks)

What is a sufficient condition? (3 marks)

What is acquaintance knowledge? (3 marks)

What is ability knowledge? (3 marks)

What is propositional knowledge? (3 marks)

What is the tripartite definition of knowledge? (5 marks)

Outline and explain reliabilism. (5 marks)

Outline and explain infallibilism. (5 marks)

Outline and explain the no false lemmas condition of knowledge. (5 marks)

Explain the no false lemmas condition of knowledge. 5 marks

Briefly outline the tripartite view of knowledge AND explain how a case of lucky true belief (A Gettier-style problem) can be used to argue against this view. 5 marks

Explain reliabilism as a response to Gettier's objections. 5 mark

Explain infallibilism as a response to Gettier's objections. 5 mark

Explain virtue epistemology as a response to Gettier's objections. 5 mark.

Explain how one of Gettier's original counter examples attacks the tripartite view of knowledge. (12 marks)

Do Gettier's objections show that Knowledge is not justified, true, belief? (25 marks)

Is knowledge Justified True belief? (25 marks)

How should propositional knowledge be defined? 25 marks

Perception

What you need to know:

Direct realism:

The immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties

Issues including:

- the argument from illusion
- the argument from perceptual variation
- the argument from hallucination
- the time-lag argument
- and responses to these issues.

Indirect realism

The immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (sense-data) that are caused by and represent mind-independent objects.

John Locke's primary/secondary quality distinction.

Issues including:

the argument that it leads to scepticism about the existence of mind-independent objects. Responses including:

Locke's argument from the involuntary nature of our experience

the argument from the coherence of various kinds of experience, as developed by Locke and Catharine Trotter Cockburn.

Bertrand Russell's response that the external world is the 'best hypothesis'

the argument from George Berkeley that we cannot know the nature of mind-independent objects because mind-dependent ideas cannot be like mind-independent objects.

Berkeley's Idealism

The immediate objects of perception (i.e. ordinary objects such as tables, chairs, etc.) are mind-dependent objects.

Arguments for idealism including Berkeley's attack on the primary/secondary quality distinction and his 'Master' argument.

Issues including:

arguments from illusion and hallucination

idealism leads to solipsism

problems with the role played by God in Berkeley's Idealism (including how can Berkeley claim that our ideas exist within God's mind given that he believes that God cannot feel pain or have sensations?)

and responses to these issues.



Key terms	
Hallucination	A non-veridical perceptual experience that is not coherently connected with the rest of our perceptual experience.
Illusion	A distortion of sense experience that means what we perceive is different from what exists.
Immediate objects of perception	What we are directly aware of in perception, which may be physical objects or sensations of these.
Mind-dependent	Depending on a mind for existence or definition.
Mind-independent	Not depending on a mind for existence or definition.
Perception	Awareness of apparently external objects through use of the senses
Perceptual variation	Different people perceive the same physical object differently.
Primary quality	Properties that are 'utterly inseparable' from the objects, whatever changes it goes through.
Property	An attribute or characteristic of an object.
Secondary quality	Properties that physical objects have that are 'nothing but powers to produce various sensations in us'.
Sense data	Mental images or representations of what is perceived.
Solipsism	The view that only oneself, one's mind, exists.
Veridical	A proposition that is true or an experience that represents the world as it actually is.

Direct Realism

Support for Direct Realism


What is it?

- There are only two things in perception: the person perceiving an object and the object itself. There is no third thing mediating between the two.
- Direct realism rejects therefore, the notion of sense data (indirect realism).
- We immediately perceive physical objects, when we perceive the world we are directly aware of the objects themselves, (no sense data).

How we perceive physical objects

- Physical objects are mind independent, this is a realist view as it means that objects exist outside of our minds, so if you close your eyes, it does not cease to exist.
- Senses detect properties of objects e.g. colour, shapes etc. which exist in the world, therefore, it is also properties of objects which exist mind-independently.
- Objects retain their properties when unperceived, so if you leave an apple in a drawer and forget about it, it remains round, hard, crisp, red, retaining its flavour and smell. When a tree falls in a forest and there is no one there to hear it, it still makes a sound.

1. DR links to common-sense. Russell says we should accept common-sense.
2. It avoids scepticism, gives us a clear account of how we come to have knowledge of the world, because our senses provide immediate access to its true nature.
3. If it is true then it explains why I am able to do a whole range of practical actions on a daily basis, for example, find food that I need to survive.
4. It explains why I perceive what I do. I see a tree as green because the tree is green. My perception of the tree is predictable and regular because there is a real tree that exists beyond my mind, I have no control over what I see when I open my eyes because there really is a mind-independent reality.
5. It explains why we agree with others about what we perceive, as we occupy the same world as everyone else, therefore, there is a high chance that there will be agreement about what people perceive.



DIRECT REALISM Argument from illusion and hallucination: Criticisms and responses

Illusions

- Senses can be subject to illusions, our senses become distorted and so the true nature of physical reality is not the same as what is actually out there in the world. When looking at a straw at a certain angle in water, it appears broken, or bent. We are therefore, directly aware of the bent-looking straw and cannot doubt that this is the way it appears to us, yet, we can also know that the real straw is not broken or bent. If the world appears to us like it can in illusions, then we must conclude that the immediate objects of perception cannot be material objects

P1: We perceive something having property e.g. the straw appears to be bent.

P2: Perceiver is directly aware of the property.

P3: But, the object does not have this property in reality.

C1; So what the perceiver is directly aware of (the bent straw) and what is real (the straight straw) are distinct.

C2: So direct realism is false, we do not perceive physical objects directly.

Response

1. Direct realists may claim that I am not directly aware of anything distinct from the physical object, as I am still perceiving a physical object.
2. I am not immediately aware of the straws appearance, as we are directly aware of the real straw and it not being bent. It only appears bent due to the light and angle of which a person perceives it. There is no mediation between the straw and my perception of it.
3. So objects can appear differently because of the way they relate to the perceiver, therefore there is no need for sense data.
4. Indirect realists are wrong when they talk about appearance and sense data, as these things are directly observed.



Argument from hallucination

- Hallucinations occur when a person perceives something which isn't actually there, and they cannot distinguish between their hallucination from a truthful perception (veridical one).
- If a hallucination and veridical perception are indistinguishable, this must mean they are both in the mind.
- So during veridical perception, we are directly perceiving sense data in the mind, we perceive the material world indirectly.

P1: Hallucinations occur when someone perceives something which does not exist outside of the mind.

C: So what they perceive, the hallucination, exists only in their mind.

P2: Hallucinations can be subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptions.

P3: But if hallucinations and veridical perceptions are indistinguishable then the person must be aware of something in both cases.

C2: So, from C1, P2 and P3, what they are directly aware of during veridical perceptions must also be in the mind.

C3: Hence we perceive the world indirectly and direct realism is false.

Response

- Just because they may be indistinguishable from veridical perceptions, does not show that they are the same phenomenon in reality.
- Hallucinations, rather being caused by a physical object impacting on our sense organs, hallucinations are produced by some sort of malfunction in the brain.
- Hallucinations and veridical perceptions are not identical phenomena, even if they are indistinguishable to the person subject to them, it does not follow from the fact that hallucinations occur in the mind that veridical perceptions involve a purely mental element.

Perceptual variation

The appearance of physical objects can vary depending on the conditions in which they are perceived.

Russell's table example

- A table can appear different colours due to light reflecting off of it. Therefore, the table cannot be said to have a particular colour.
- The shape can also vary depending on the angle from which I perceive it. Since the table does not change shape, we must distinguish the real table from the one appearing in our minds. Russell says the table is not known to us immediately, but is an inference from what is immediately known to us via our perception.

P1: DR immediate objects of perception are material objects and their properties.

P2: But, the appearance of physical objects when perceived can vary.

P3: The properties of the objects themselves do not vary.

C: So DR is false, the apparent properties are not the same as the real properties of physical objects.

- Therefore, the immediate objects of perception are appearances or sense data, so we do not perceive the world directly. As we must infer the existence and the real properties of objects on the direct acquaintance with sense data.

Berkeley's example

- If you place one hot hand and one cold hand into a bowl of lukewarm water the water will appear cold to one and hot to the other. He uses this example to show that it is absurd for realists to claim that the perceived qualities exist in matter as they are perceived.


P1: DR claims material objects possess mind-independent properties (such as heat/cold, tastes, smells and colours) which we directly perceive.

P2: But, material objects are perceived to have incompatible properties (for example, cold and hot at the same time).

P3: They cannot possess incompatible properties in reality as it is contradictory.

C; Therefore, DR is false, material objects do not possess such properties.

Russell denying that objects have real properties, as we do not perceive them directly as they are, but Berkeley's conclusion is that the perceived qualities of objects are in the mind, rather than the object.



Response

- DR can accept that objects may appear differently to perceivers, but, insist that they are nonetheless directly perceived. Water can appear cold to a perceiver even if it is lukewarm, this does not mean it is not directly perceived.
- We have agreed methods for determining the correct temperature of the water or colour of the table. We rarely find ourselves in disagreements about such things, if we are in any doubt, then we can move around the table to avoid any glare to tell the real colour of the table.
- We can explain why the colour of the table can vary, this is due to the reflection of light from its surface, also, the water feels warm or cold as this is relative to the temperature of our hands to that of the water.

Time-lag argument

- Light from the sun takes a certain amount of time to travel to Earth, about 8 mins.
- So when we look at the sun, we are not seeing the sun as it is now, but as it was 8 mins ago.
- So what we are seeing is sense data caused in you by the Sun's light impacting on your visual system, and not the sun itself.
- What is true of distant objects is no less true of objects close to you, it's just that the time-lag is far shorter.
- So we can generalise and say that the immediate objects of perception are sense data, and our perception of all physical objects is indirect.

P1: The light from distant objects (such as the sun) takes time to reach our eyes.

C1: So what we are seeing now may no longer exist.


C2:: so what we are seeing and what is there are different

P2: This is no less true for physical objects at any distance.

C3: And so, what we directly see are appearances not the physical objects, and direct realism is false.

Response

- The time-lag does not mean we are seeing objects indirectly, it just means that we are seeing them as they were.
- These process of mediation are not sense data and none of this implies that we are directly aware of sense data or that we must use sense data to infer the existence of objects.
- Instead once we become aware of an object we are aware of the object itself.



Indirect Realism

What is it?


- Due to the criticisms of direct realism, many philosophers embrace indirect realism.
- It is a realist theory, so maintains the belief that material objects exist independently of the mind.
- But, there is a distinction between the reality of these objects and the way they appear.
- 3 elements in perception 1: the perceiver. 2: the real object. 3: the appearance of the object/s to the perceiver.
- We are directly aware of appearances, which Locke terms ideas and Russell, sense data. These are representations of reality.
- We infer, on the basis of sense data, the nature of reality, due to this inference, perception is indirect.

Locke Primary and secondary qualities

- Locke: ideas = what the mind perceives in itself, the immediate objects of perception, thought, or understanding is what Locke calls 'ideas'.
- Qualities = the power to produce any idea in our mind
- Primary qualities = Real properties are primary qualities, when I look at a tree, my sense data of its size, shape position and motion.
- Secondary qualities = such as colour, taste and sound do not correspond directly to the object as these qualities are produced by my mind as they produce a sensation within us or an idea within us.
- Primary qualities are inseparable from the object, its parts remain the same no matter if we divide, pound an object, its parts must retain some shape, size, position and so on, even if we can no longer see the parts as without these qualities it would not be material at all.
- So primary qualities must be essential to material objects and are retained by them whether or not they are perceived.
- Secondary qualities do alter and vanish when not being perceived. Odours are only visible in light and change depending on the light. A pounded almond changes its colour and taste
- If we block our noses, or eyes, or do not put an object in our mouths, then it will not make a sound or have any odour or taste.
- Secondary qualities depend on the primary qualities and require a mind to appear and so are not in the object themselves as we perceive them.
- REMEMBER THE HAND IN THE LUKEWARM WATER EXAMPLE AS THIS EXPLAINS LOCKE'S VIEWAS DOES PERCEPTUAL VARIATION.

Support for Indirect Realism

- 1: It accounts for perceptual variation, illusions, hallucinations, and time-lag.
- 2: What we directly perceive need not be an accurate representation of reality.
- 3: Perceptual variations can occur while the real object remains unchanged.
- 4: Illusions occur when there is no real object corresponding to our sense data, and the time-lag can be explained because what I immediately aware of is not the same as what is really there, so strengths over Direct Realism.



Criticism of Locke's Primary and secondary qualities

- Locke's examples show that primary and secondary qualities can change.
 - When an almond is pounded, the shape, taste, smell and colour change. So if change is supposed to show that a quality is secondary, then by Locke's logic we should regard the shape and size of the pieces of almond as mind-dependent.
 - If secondary qualities depend on the texture of the almond, this does not show that they are purely mind-dependent.
- P1: certain properties disappear if we block our senses.
C: So these qualities depend on our sense organs and do not exist as perceived in reality.
- But, if we close our eyes, both the primary and secondary qualities disappear.
 - We can handle objects to feel their shapes, but if we let go then these sense experiences stop, so it looks like primary qualities behave the same as secondary qualities.

Issues with Indirect Realism and responses

Scepticism about the existence of mind-independent objects

- We must infer the existence of objects beyond the mind, as we are only aware of sense data.
- Our senses can deceive us.
- Our sense data does not correspond with any material reality, e.g. if I am a brain in a vat, or the Cartesian Demon is deceiving me.
- These show that the inferences are not valid, therefore, not sufficient for knowledge.
- Since we cannot directly observe reality, we cannot know it exists (THE VEIL OF PERCEPTION) our sense data creates a veil between us and reality which we cannot remove/penetrate to discover the material world.

Response to the issue of the existence of mind-independent objects

Involuntary nature of our experience (LOCKE)

- We are not in control of our sense data.
- Sense data does not come from me.
- Therefore the source of it must be external (outside of me).

The coherence of various kinds of experience (LOCKE and COCKBURN)

- Our different senses cohere with each other.
- We can see a fire and feel a fire.
- We can hear and see a bus moving.
- Cockburn says we learn to associate the way objects feel to the touch and the way they appear to the eye. I can predict how things may look just by touching them.
- The senses offer support for each others testimony, so there is one external cause for both of them.
- Locke knows this is not a deductive, valid argument, as just because our senses cohere does not mean that they must be caused by material objects, e.g. dreams do not correspond to a material reality, yet I can feel, hear and see objects. But, Locke hopes his argument for the existence of material objects is reasonable enough and the best explanation for our experiences.

The external world is the best hypothesis (RUSSELL).

Russell accepts that no deductive proof of the nature of a material reality is possible. But, he believes that scepticism can be resisted and offers his best hypothesis or explanation. His argument is that we have an instinctive belief in the existence of a material reality which corresponds with our sense data, therefore, we should only reject such beliefs if they prove to be incoherent. So, Russell is putting the issue back onto the sceptic by asking for proof of why believing in a material reality is wrong. His argument makes good sense of our experiences, it explains why our sense data appear in regular and predictable ways, as Locke pointed out.

RUSSELL'S CAT EXAMPLE: If the cat appears at one moment in one part of the room, and at another in another part, it is natural to suppose that it has moved from the one to the other. But if it is merely a set of sense-data, it cannot have ever been in any place where I did not see it; thus we shall have to suppose that it did not exist at all while I was not looking, but suddenly sprang into being in a new place. If the cat exists whether I see it or not, we can understand from our own experience how it gets hungry between one meal and the next; but if it does not exist when I am not seeing it, it seems odd that appetite should grow during non-existence as fast as during existence. And if the cat consists only of sense-data, it cannot be hungry, since no hunger but my own can be a sense-datum to me. Thus the behaviour of the sense-data which represent the cat to me, though it seems quite natural when regarded as an expression of hunger, becomes utterly inexplicable when regarded as mere movements and changes of patches of colour.

ISSUE: Ideas cannot be like material objects (BERKELEY)

Berkeley argues that Russell's view is an incoherent one.

- All sense data including primary qualities are mind-dependent.
 - We only have awareness of our own sense data.
 - The qualities we perceive in objects require a perceiving mind to exist. Since matter is said to be unperceiving, it cannot have such properties.
- P1: My idea of a tree has certain sensible qualities, green, tree shaped etc.
P2: But, these sensible qualities depend on the mind.
P3: To say that my idea of a tree resembles the real material tree is like saying something visible can resemble something invisible.
P4: Ideas are changing, whereas material objects are supposed to be permanent and unchanging.
C1: Anything outside of the mind, like matter, cannot have any such qualities.
C2: A supposed material object could not be like or resemble my idea of it.

Idealism: Berkeley

What is it?

- All that exists are minds and their ideas.
- Physical objects therefore do not exist independently of being perceived. They are no more than collections of ideas or sense data appearing in minds.
- Berkeley argues that the universe is sustained in existence through being perceived by the infinite mind of God.
- God directly causes our ideas or sense data.

Criticism of Berkeley's primary and secondary qualities distinction

Yes, both primary and secondary qualities can vary depending on the position and so forth of the perceiver. But, it does not follow that the qualities themselves cannot be mind-independent.

P1: Apparent size, shape or motion of an object varies.

P2: A material object's objective properties cannot vary.

C: Therefore, apparent size, shape and motion cannot be objective properties of material objects. But material objects can still have some specific size, shape and motion independent of the mind.

Berkeley's attack on the primary and secondary qualities distinction

- Both P and S qualities do not resemble anything beyond the mind.
- We can conceive of an object without secondary qualities and therefore these too must be essential to our idea of an object.
- Try to imagine an object with only the primary qualities. When we try to do this, we imagine it with colour, therefore we cannot distinguish between primary and secondary qualities, both are equally mind-dependent.

P1: It is impossible to imagine an object with just P qualities.

C1: so our ideas of secondary qualities of an object cannot be separated from those of its primary qualities.

C2: So they must exist together.

P2: Indirect realists accept that our ideas of secondary qualities are mind-dependent.

C3: So our ideas of primary qualities are also mind-dependent.

Perceptual variation for Berkeley shows that P and s qualities are not distinguishable. As shape, size and movement are subject to perceptual changes and so cannot be considered as real properties of external objects.

P1: What looks small to us will look big to a fly.

P2: Material objects cannot be small and big at the same time.

C: Therefore, size cannot be a property of material objects.

P1: The perceived shape of an object changes depending on the angle of observation.

P2: But an object cannot have different shapes at the same time.

C: Therefore, shape cannot be a property of material objects

And so on, Berkeley's conclusion is that primary qualities are mind-dependent, just like secondary qualities



Idealism: Berkeley's 'master' argument and criticisms of idealism

Berkeley's master argument

- Berkeley's 'master' argument tries to show that the very idea of a mind-independent material object is impossible. This is because, when we think about an object we automatically get an image in our head of the object.

P1: Try to conceive of a tree which exists independently of any mind.

P2: In doing so, the tree is being conceived by you.

C: Therefore the tree is in your mind and not independent of any mind after all.

Criticism of Berkeley's 'master' argument.

Russell argues that Berkeley's error is to confuse the mental act of conceiving a thing with the thing being conceived. So it is true that my idea of a tree must be in my mind, but it doesn't follow that what my idea is about, the tree itself, must be in my mind.

Berkeley's argument if true, would show that I cannot make sense of an idea existing outside of my mind. It would mean that only my mind could exist and so would lead to solipsism (see key word list). Berkeley's appeal to God's existence as an eternal perceiver would be undermined and his whole system would collapse.

Berkeley does not fully explain why an idea can only be like another idea. Without being able to compare our ideas with reality we have no way of establishing such resemblance.

If we accept the existence of the external world then it seems reasonable to suppose that there will be a systematic correlation between reality and our perceptions of it.

Issue: Idealism leads to solipsism

If ideas of qualities of objects exist in the mind, then I cannot know of the existence of any reality beyond it. The 'master' argument says it is impossible to have an idea of a mind-independent object. This implies that the world first appeared to me when I was born and will disappear when I die and comes in and out of existence when I shut my eyes and open them.

But, this objection ignores Berkeley's role of God, as objects exist in God's mind as a permanent perceiver of the universe when no finite human or animal mind is perceiving it. So objects retain some kind of permanence that common sense would demand.

But can we make sense of the idea of God as Berkeley argues minds can only be aware of their ideas. Since a mind is the possessor of ideas, it is not itself and idea, so we cannot have an idea of a mind, therefore, we cannot have an idea of God's mind or of any other minds, so we are back into solipsism.

Berkeley's response to solipsism



"YOU'RE A SOLIPSIST? NONSENSE,
MAN--IT'S ALL IN YOUR MIND!"

He admits that I cannot have an idea of God's mind. God's mind is not something that has sensible qualities and so it is something I cannot frame in my mind. But I can form a 'notion' of it by 'intuition' or 'reflection' on myself. As Descartes argued, Berkeley claims that I am aware of a self which possesses my ideas. This self is something unextended and indivisible.

Berkeley thinks he has satisfactorily proved the existence of God as the cause of my ideas and what sustains the universe in existence. So I can extend this 'notion' of myself by enlarging my own power and subtracting the my imperfections to produce a notion of the mind of God.

Idealism: Problems with the role played by God, illusions and hallucinations.

- Berkeley thinks that the philosophical idea of matter is incoherent and that the only source of our sense data must be something that can itself possess sense data and which has active power to cause them in us.
- Matter can do neither as it is not sentient (able to perceive or feel things) or active.
- He also agrees with Locke and Russell that the regularity and predictability of our sense data, and that they are not subject to my will and that different senses cohere with each other, shows that the source of them is external to me.
- He concludes that the source of sense data must be a mind, a powerful mind.
- So, Berkeley does not see it as bringing God in to save his theory, but that his arguments have led to the existence of God as the only possible explanation of our experience.

- How can we distinguish between reality and imagined objects if perception is dependent on the mind?
- Berkeley responds by saying the imagined is subject to my will, I am in control, I conjure their existence, when I imagine an object it is far less vivid and clear than when I am actually perceiving one.
- But, if there is no mind-independent reality, then illusions and hallucinations would appear no different from veridical perceptions, which does not fit with common sense.
- Berkeley responds by saying when subject to an illusion, I am not mistaken about the actual sense data or ideas. An illusion and hallucination are subjectively indistinguishable from other sense experiences and it would be nonsense to say we could be wrong about these. They are illusory because they incline us to make false inferences about what we may perceive next. If I try to grab a dagger which I see before me, but clutch thin air, then I have been fooled by a hallucination. If I see an oar half bent in water, it will also feel bent to the touch, then I'm making an error.
- The error in both cases is with the inference made about further sense data because I judged I would have certain tactile sensations which are not forthcoming.

Can God have sensations?

A problem is that if God is the source of sense experiences and perceives all then God is subject to sensations, including pain and so therefore, God cannot be perfect.

P1: What we perceive is in the mind of God.

C1: It follows that the idea of pain is in the mind of God; God suffers pain.

P2: But if God suffers pain, then he is imperfect.

P3: God is defined as a perfect being.

C2: Therefore, Berkeley's views lead to contradiction.

Berkeley's response God knows what it is for us to suffer, but God does not suffer himself. We suffer because pain is caused in us by the laws of nature, we have no control over them. But God does not have a body, so God does not suffer pain or other sensations against his will. God is pure spirit and determines his ideas, he cannot passively 'suffer' from pain or any other sensations. But, there is still a problem, as sensations change and are fleeting, the world perceived by God is also one of change. If God has sensations, then he must change. And if he changes then he cannot be perfect and immutable,



"Is this a dagger which I see before me,
The handle toward my hand? Come, let me clutch thee



Differences between idealism and indirect realism

Idealism	Indirect realism
Anti-realist theory, objects are mind-dependent.	Form of realism. Objects are mind-independent.
Berkeley's idealism is a direct theory of perception, physical objects are clusters of sensible qualities directly perceived by the mind.	We perceive the qualities of matter but that these qualities exist in a material substance which is not directly perceived. The existence and nature of material objects must be inferred from their representations in the mind.
Regularity and predictability of our sense experiences and the persistence of objects unperceived by finite minds by appeal to the mind of God as a permanent perceiver and the source of our perceptions.	Matter is the best explanation of experience.
Ideas cannot be like anything but other ideas.	Sense data and ideas are representations of material reality.
No distinction between primary and secondary qualities.	Traditionally, there is a distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

Perception

Direct realism

P1:	All objects are composed of matter, which gives them properties such as size, shape, texture, smell, taste and colour.
P2:	We use our senses to perceive these objects directly.
C:	The external world is as we perceive it.

Argument from perceptual variation

P1:	There are variations in perception.
P2:	Our perception varies without corresponding changes in the physical objects we perceive.
C1:	Properties physical objects have and the properties they appear to have are not identical.
C2:	What we are immediately aware of in perception is <u>not</u> exactly the same as what exists independently of our minds.
C3:	We do not perceive physical objects directly.

Argument from illusion

P1:	We perceive something having some property, F
P2:	When we perceive something having some property F, then there is something that has this property.
P3:	In an illusion, the physical object does not have the property F
C	Therefore, what has the property F is something mental, a sense-datum.

Argument from hallucination

P1	In a hallucination, we perceive something having some property F.
P2:	When we perceive something having some property F, then there is something that has this property.
P3:	In hallucinations we don't perceive a physical object at all
C:	Therefore, what we perceive must be mental – sense-data.

The time lag argument

P1:	It takes time for light waves, or sound waves, or smells, to get from physical objects to our sense organs.
P2:	We can perceive something even after it ceases to exist (e.g. distant stars).
C:	We aren't perceiving physical objects directly.

Indirect realism

P1:	We perceive physical objects which are mind-independent.
P2:	But we do so via, or in virtue of, perceiving mind-dependent sense-data.
P3:	Sense-data are caused by and represent physical objects.
C:	We perceive sense-data immediately, and physical objects indirectly.

The external world as the best hypothesis. Russell

P1	Either physical objects exist and cause my sense-data or physical objects do not exist nor cause my sense-data.
P2:	I can't prove either claim is true or false.
C1:	I have to treat both claims as hypotheses.
P3:	The hypothesis that physical objects exist and cause my sense-data is better.
C2:	Physical objects exist and cause my sense-data

Idealism

P1:	Each sense perceives particular types of qualities.
P2:	When we perceive physical objects, we don't perceive anything in addition to primary or secondary qualities.
P3:	Everything we perceive is either a primary or secondary quality.
P4:	Both primary and secondary qualities are mind-dependent.
C:	Nothing that we perceive exists independently of our mind: the objects of perception are entirely mind-dependent.

Master argument

P1:	We cannot conceive of a mind-dependent object.
P2	To conceive of a mind-dependent involves thinking about it, and therefore it becomes mind-dependent.
C1:	The idea of a mind-independent object is contradictory
C2:	Any thought of an object outside of any mind can only take place in the mind.
C3:	Only mind-dependent objects exist.

What is direct realism? What is indirect realism? What is perceptual variation? What is a Primary quality?

What is a Secondary quality? What is perceptual variation? 3 marks

Outline and explain Berkeley's idealism and explain how it leads to solipsism. 5 marks

Explain the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. 5 marks.

Briefly explain direct realism AND Explain how the 'argument from illusion' can be used to argue against this view. 5 Marks.

Explain why for Locke extension is a primary quality. 5 marks Briefly explain Berkeley's master argument. 5 marks

Briefly explain direct realism AND explain how the 'argument from hallucination' can be used to argue against this view 12 Marks.

Are direct realists right to claim that the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent? 25 marks

Are indirect realists right to claim that immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent? 25 marks

Is Berkeley right in claiming the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent? 25 marks

Is Russell right in claiming that the external world is the best hypothesis? 25 marks

**Possible
exam
questions**

What you need to know:

Reason as a source of knowledge

Possible Exam Questions

Innatism

Arguments from Plato (i.e. the 'slave boy' argument) and Gottfried Leibniz (i.e. his argument based on necessary truths).

Empiricist responses including:

Locke's arguments against innatism

the mind as a 'tabula rasa' (the nature of impressions and ideas, simple and complex concepts)

and issues with these responses.

The intuition and deduction thesis

The meaning of 'intuition' and 'deduction' and the distinction between them.

René Descartes' notion of 'clear and distinct ideas'.


His cogito as an example of an a priori intuition.

His arguments for the existence of God and his proof of the external world as examples of a priori deductions.

Empiricist responses including:

Responses to Descartes' cogito

Responses to Descartes' arguments for the existence of God and his proof of the external world (including how Hume's Fork might be applied to these arguments) and issues with these responses.



What is tabula rasa? 3 marks
 What is a synthetic proposition? 3 marks
 what is an analytic proposition? 3 marks
 What is a priori? 3 marks
 What is a posteriori? 3 marks
 What is rationalism 3 marks
 What is innatism? 3 marks
 What is solipsism? 3 marks

Explain the empiricist distinction between simple and complex concepts. 5 marks
 Briefly explain Locke's argument against innatism 5 marks.
 Explain Hume's fork. 5 marks
 Explain Locke's argument against innatism. 5 marks
 Explain Descartes trademark argument

Explain how Descartes argues that we can gain a priori knowledge through intuition and deduction 12 marks.

Is knowledge known a priori? 25 marks
 Is innate knowledge known a priori? 25 marks

Types of knowledge and key terms

Types of knowledge and key terms

Analytic proposition	A proposition is true because the meanings of the words are true.
Synthetic proposition	A proposition that is true or false depending on how the world is.
A priori knowledge	Knowledge of propositions that do not require sense experiences to be true
A posteriori knowledge	Knowledge of propositions that can only be known to be true or false through sense experience
Necessary truth	A proposition that must be true if it is true, or false if it is false. The 'necessity' of a truth cannot be revealed by the senses, but only reason.
Contingent truth	A proposition that could be either true or false, depending on how the world actually is
External world	All that exists outside of or independently of the mind; the physical world.
Innate ideas	Ideas that exist in the mind which are not acquired from experience. We are all born with innate knowledge which enable us to recognise individual concepts that we possess without experience. Plato, Leibniz and Descartes.
Scepticism	Philosophical scepticism is raising doubt about our claims to know. Global scepticism is doubt of all knowledge claims and argues that we can know nothing. It can also be applied to some subset of knowledge claims for example religion, this would be classed as local scepticism. The purpose of sceptic is to test our knowledge claims and if they survive the attack then it can be classed as knowledge.
Empiricism	That our beliefs and knowledge must be based sole on experience and not reason.
Induction	An argument where the truth of the conclusion is not fully guaranteed by the truth of the premises, e.g. all the ravens I have seen are black, therefore all ravens must be black, this is a generalisation moving from experience to a prediction about the future.

Deductive argument	An argument where the truth of the conclusion is guaranteed by the truth of the premises. An argument in which the premises entail the conclusion. If the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. P1: Socrates is a man P2: All men are mortal C: Socrates is mortal
Rationalism	Reason as opposed to sense experiences is the primary source of the important knowledge we are capable of. Using mathematics as the ideal of how knowledge should be, rationalist use this to extend this type of knowledge into other areas such as knowledge of the external world.
Clear and distinct ideas	Self-justifying beliefs that Descartes uses for his foundation for knowledge. They are ones that can be intuited by the mind via reason alone. This intuition leaves no room for doubt or error, there is no further evidence needed to justify such knowledge.
Intuition	A mental seeing by which rational truths can be recognised. For Descartes, the mind deploys the faculty of intuition through reason, e.g. $2+2=4$

Reason as a source of knowledge

Knowledge empiricism (Against rationalism and innatism)

All knowledge of synthetic propositions is a posteriori, while all a priori knowledge is of analytic propositions.

Hume	<u>Relation of ideas</u>
(Hume's fork)	A priori / Analytic propositions / Reason / Concepts and ideas rather than physical / Absolutely certain/ True by definition / Known by deduction
	<u>Matters of fact</u>
	A posteriori / Synthetic propositions / Facts and generalisations about the world / Not 100% certain / Reliant on how the world is / Can be denied without contradiction / Not known by deduction
	<u>Causal inference</u>
	Knowledge comes from observation and experience, and what is in our memory / Anything beyond that rests on causal inference. / If we don't have the experience then we can't make the causal inference. / Knowledge only comes from a posteriori experience. / Reason only imposes order on causal relationships.



Rationalism



Knowledge innatism (rationalists)

There is at least some innate knowledge

Leibniz	Sense experiences provide us with knowledge of specific instances. Many instances only confirm a general, rather than universal, truth. Therefore we can't establish universal, necessary truths. Some a priori knowledge can be doubted. Therefore some a priori knowledge must be contingent truths. Therefore not all a priori knowledge is analytic, so there must be some innate knowledge
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Descartes	Uses deductive arguments based on a priori reasoning to prove synthetic propositions: The Cogito: Descartes doubts his beliefs until he reaches a point of certainty, the cogito. P1: I am thinking P2: All thinking things exist C: Therefore I exist. Descartes denies this is a deductive argument, and says it is an intuition of the mind as to him it is self-evident. You can only be doubting if you are thinking. He needs it to be an intuition as he is still working under the assumption that a demon may deceive him. I am I exist must be true whenever I assert it or think it, so the truth of the cogito is revealed in performing it as the thought that I do not exist is self-defeating. The cogito seems to be based on reason alone, but it could be said that Descartes learns the cogito by experiencing his own thinking and that it is not possible to think without existing, but if it is a self-justifying thought and can be known independently of experience then it must be a priori.
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Criticism of innatism (empiricism)

All concepts are derived from experience

Locke	<u>Tabla Rasa (blank slate) argument</u> Before we experience something we have no ideas, thoughts or concepts. Our ideas come from: 1)Sensation – we experience objects outside the mind using our senses. This gives us ideas of 'sensible' or secondary qualities. 2)Reflection – we experience our own mind through introspection or awareness of what our mind is doing. This gives us perception, thinking, willing etc. <u>Also:</u> Sensation (seeing) yellow isn't the same as the concept (notion or idea) of YELLOW. Seeing (experiencing yellow) is different to the role YELLOW plays in the thought (concept) 'If it is yellow it is coloured'.
Hume	What we are immediately aware of in perception can be divided into impressions (sensing or feeling) and ideas (thinking). Both can be divided into sensation (coming from the senses) and reflection (coming from ourselves). Ideas are acquired by copying from impressions. Impressions: We experience them directly / More forceful and vivid than ideas / Difficult to confuse impressions

Reason as a source of knowledge

<u>Descartes arguments for the existence of God</u>	
The Trademark argument	<p>P1: The cause of anything must be at least as perfect as its effect. P2: My ideas must be caused by something. P3: I am imperfect. P4: I have the idea of God, which is that of a perfect being.</p> <p>C1: I cannot be the cause of my idea of God C2: Only perfect beings can be the cause of my idea of God.</p> <p>Main C: God must exist.</p> <p>He can see this clearly and distinctly – It passes the truth test.</p>
The ontological argument	<p>Descartes considers whether his own existence is enough to show that God must exist.</p> <p>To try and prove this he tries to investigate where his own existence has come from.</p> <p>P1: The cause of my existence as a thinking thing must be either A) Myself, B) I have always existed, C) My parents or D) God. P2: I cannot have caused myself to exist for then I would have created myself perfect. P3: Neither have I always existed, for then I would be aware of this. P4: My parents may be the cause of my physical existence, but not of me as a thinking mind. C (by elimination) Therefore, only God could have created me.</p>
The contingency argument	<p>Descartes argues that his intellect can take any intelligible object and work out which features are essential to it.</p> <p>He attempts this with his idea of God, which is the idea of a supremely perfect being. To be perfect God must have all perfections, this includes the property of existence. Therefore, God must exist.</p> <p>P1: I have an idea of God, as a perfect being. P2: A perfect being must have all perfections P3: Existence is a perfection C: God exists</p>

<u>Criticisms</u>	
The Trademark argument	<p>Our minds can easily create better versions of real objects. Hume argued that our idea of God is derived from considering virtues in other people (you experience these virtues, so come up with the idea that there must be a God, hence how we can come up with better versions of things ourselves.)</p> <p>Hume says we need experience of causes and effects conjoined before we can learn of their connection, so, from, knowing the effect, idea of God, we cannot deduce what might have caused God. But can God be too great for us to understand.</p> <p>Some would argue that we do not have a clear idea of a perfect God or of infinity. If these concepts are not present in our minds, then how can we possibly have an idea of God in our minds?</p>
The contingency argument	<p>Why must we have been created by a perfect being?</p> <p>I may have been created by an evil scientist or an angel or even the process of evolution?</p> <p>Why does our author have to be myself, my parents, or a perfect being? These options are not the only ones! Both of the arguments Descartes presents to prove the existence of God both start from observations about the world, e.g. having an idea of God, so they are a posteriori deductions.</p> <p>They are abductive, this means that the arguments eliminate all other possibilities, they attempt to 'deduce' the only possible cause.</p>
The ontological argument	<p>Gaunillo: we can imagine things that are perfect e.g. an island. Everyone has different perceptions of perfection. So anyone can prove anything is perfect.</p> <p>Kant: Existence is not a property of something. We are not describing God when we say he exists, we are not adding to the idea of God by saying this. The idea of God does not change whether he exists or not.</p> <p>Hume: Can only establish the existence of God through experience. The existence of objects is only true through experience. Objects can contain existence but that does not mean they will always exist.</p>

Descartes responses to the criticisms of the ontological argument

The idea of an island is not like the idea of God.

An island is not an intelligible object in the same way a triangle is, so we cannot discover its features just by thinking.

The idea of a perfect island will differ between minds.

CRITICISM: But it can also be argued that the idea of God can differ between minds.



Rationalism



The existence of the external world

Russell	Locke	Descartes	Reliabilism
<p>We cannot conclusively prove the existence of the external world, but we cannot prove it does not exist either.</p> <p>Russell says that there are two possibilities, (hypothesis), that the physical world exists and so do physical objects and they cause my sensations, or the physical world does not exist. He concludes it is better to believe that the external world exists.</p> <p>The physical world hypothesis is by far, for Russell, the best option. This is an abduction - an inference to the best explanation.</p> <p>The existence of the physical world can explain why our sense experiences behave in regular and predictable ways. An apple in a drawer that has been forgotten will be found months later rotten. This is because the apple physically exists and has transformed whilst not being observed. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the external world exists.</p>	<p>Our knowledge is confined to the world as it appears to our senses, and we cannot penetrate through the veil of perception to reveal the essence of reality.</p> <p>We cannot conclusively prove the existence of the external world, the possibility of doubt is not a good reason for giving up on a set of beliefs.</p> <p>Scepticism about the external world is not possible on a practical level only on a theoretical level. The practical business of living is what really matters to us.</p> <p>Perceptions are not subject to my will and therefore it must come from an external source, the external world.</p> <p>Our senses cohere with each other, Cockburn says we learn to associate the way objects appear, feel etc to predict how things will look or what I will perceive next, if I am writing on paper I can predict what the words will say even if my eyes are shut. The senses suggest that there is one external world causing perceptions.</p>	<p>Sensations of objects cannot come from inside him (internal) and must be caused by the external world.</p> <p>P1: The will is part of my essence P2: sensation is not subject to my will C: Sensations come from outside of me (external)</p> <p>P1: My nature or essence is unextended (not broad, stretched out) P2: Sensations are ideas of extended things (broad things) C: sensations come from outside of me.</p> <p>Sensations for Descartes therefore originate in matter.</p> <p>P1: Two possible sources for the origin of sensations, God or matter. P2: I have a strong natural inclination to believe they come from matter, and I have no faculty by which to correct this belief. C1: So if their origin were in God, God would be a deceiver. P3 God is not a deceiver C: Sensations originate in matter</p>	<p>Knowledge is reliably produced true belief. So a person can have knowledge even if they cannot give justification for the belief.</p> <p>Justification seems to be a weakness in most knowledge, as in, I see a red car, my justification for this is my eyes, but can our eyes deceive us? So the skeptical argument fails in regards to reliabilism as we do not need a justification for our beliefs. If the belief is reliably produced then there is a car there.</p> <p>Beliefs can count as knowledge even if we cannot provide a defence of our belief.</p> <p>Even though I cannot tell that I may be a brain in a vat, this does not show that I do not have knowledge of the world, as if I am in the normal world, then my beliefs about it are produced by a reliable process and so are knowledge. If I know there is a red car in the road then it must be the case that the material world exists. So we can have knowledge of the world, despite global skepticism, but we may not be able to know that we have knowledge.</p>
<p>Criticisms</p>	<p>Criticisms</p>	<p>Criticisms</p>	<p>Criticism</p>
<p>Because it is a hypothesis we cannot be certain of the conclusion. There can be no deductive proof of the nature of a material reality.</p> <p>There may be other explanations of the existence of the external world.</p>	<p>They are not deductively valid arguments. Just because I cannot control my sense experiences does not mean they are external caused.</p> <p>Dreams, I cannot always control my dreams, but they do not always correspond to a material world.</p>	<p>Sensations may come from a part of me I am not aware of, like dreams, they are within me even if they are not subject to my will.</p> <p>Perhaps God feeds the ideas of material things into our minds (Berkeley's view)</p> <p>It relies on his proof of the existence of God, if his arguments for the existence of God do not succeed then there is no guarantee that we are not being radically deceived, and the world may be very different from the way it appears.</p> <p>Other philosophers' theories on the existence of the external world.</p>	<p>If I believe that I am holding a pen justified in the real world, then, given that the experience is exactly the same, it seems right to say that the belief I am holding a pen is justified in the brain in a vat scenario, it just wouldn't be true. In replacing justification with reliability, reliabilism can account for our lack of knowledge in a brain in a vat scenario, but, it does not seem to give an adequate account of the relationship between our beliefs and justifications.</p>